Fall of the USSR
Gorbachev’s reforms were implemented in an impatient, heavy-handed, top-down way, without consulting the people or attempting to collate feedback. His methodology was profoundly flawed. Soviet economists transitioned from central-planning dogma to neoliberal dogma, failing to come up with creative approaches that accurately took account of existing strengths and weaknesses.
Carlo Martinez. The End of the Beginning (p. 162). LeftWord. Kindle Edition.
Despite his neo-Leninist rhetoric, Gorbachev could not decide on a strategy of reforms during his first two years in power. As an admirer of Lenin, he searched for some key leverage that could revive Soviet society and the economy. Yet he also heeded Andropov’s conservative advice: before any radical political changes, suggested by Yakovlev, Soviet people should feel tangible improvements in the economy. Soon after coming to power, therefore, Gorbachev listed the economic and social problems he wanted to address: “1) Quality; 2) Struggle against drinking; 3) People in need; 4) Land for orchards and gardens; 5) Medicine.” 35 Surprisingly, the list did not include the pressing issues that Andropov had raised about Soviet macroeconomic stability: the need to reduce the import of food, restore the balance of trade, crack down on the shadow economy, and discipline the labor force. Gorbachev’s notes did not contain any diagnosis of the economic and financial problems plaguing the Soviet Union. The Politburo
V. M. Zubok. Collapse (p. 23). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.
Andropov’s main contribution to Soviet reforms was the team of people and academics he had brought into the Politburo and the Soviet government. It took them a further two years to launch the reforms he had initiated. The key man whom the ex-KGB reformer had groomed to continue his policies was Mikhail Gorbachev.
V. M. Zubok. Collapse (pp. 18-19). Yale University Press. Kindle Edition.