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The End of the Beginning

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Socialism in practice conclusively solved many of the worst of humanity’s problems; problems which capitalism had not (and still has not) been able to resolve. — location: 98 ^ref-48318

in a socialist system, where the fruits of labour are shared by the people rather than being monopolized by the capitalist class, the existence of unemployment is a shocking waste of resources. — location: 142 ^ref-17840

The Soviet system . . . gave these republics, regions, and autonomous districts, established over huge territories, the right to their cultural and linguistic expression, which had been despised by the tsarist government. — location: 179 ^ref-3087

it is crucial to bear in mind that capitalist progress was built on a bedrock of colonialism and imperialism. — location: 233 ^ref-24131

The reasons for this are manifold and disputed, but they centre round a failure of the existing economic system to produce significant gains in productivity from the mid-1960s onwards. — location: 360 ^ref-56057

‘It is a law of technology that the more types of jobs a tool can do, the less specialized and productive it will be’, — location: 399 ^ref-5283

Over-centralization of production ended up impeding the development of more modern, highly technical and capital-intensive industry. — location: 400 ^ref-19520

between 1975 and 1991, industrial labour productivity fell by as much as 50 per cent. — location: 410 ^ref-545

For the leading capitalist powers, an easier life was established through exploitation of the poorer sections of the working class and through neo-colonialism. For the Soviet Union, however, these options were not available. The way to have more food, better housing, better clothes, cars and so on was to produce more, to work more effectively. — location: 465 ^ref-9571

The Soviet Union, as Kotz and Weir found, ‘largely failed to absorb the revolution in communication and information-processing brought by electronics and computers’. By the time of the Soviet collapse, use of computing in industry and military technology is reckoned to have been around twenty years behind that of the United States. — location: 496 ^ref-19104

At ground level, with a heavy emphasis on annual production targets, there was minimal incentive for risk-averse enterprise managers to introduce sweeping technological changes, and in the absence of a centrally-mandated and society-wide information revolution, computerization was somewhat marginalized. — location: 507 ^ref-20989

It is necessary to see to it that those who boldly introduce new technology will not find themselves at a disadvantage. — location: 512 ^ref-44102

Once they realized they were falling behind, Soviet leaders hoped to catch up quickly through technology transfer – importing Western computers and reverse-engineering them. However, US policymakers deliberately made that difficult by imposing tight trade embargoes. — location: 525 ^ref-27964

China, however, has succeeded in its programme of technology transfer, overcoming obstacles that the Soviets weren’t able to surmount. — location: 533 ^ref-37372

An emerging socialist society must participate in the international division of labour in order to survive and then prosper. . . . The Soviet Union could compete with the most advanced capitalist powers individually. But it could not compete when it cut itself off from world markets and they collaborated within world markets. — location: 548 ^ref-21708

It is not fair to say that the USSR ‘cut itself off from world markets’ – in reality it was actively cut out of the international division of labour by the imperialist powers, — location: 550 ^ref-36481

China from the late 1970s developed an incredibly sophisticated means of levering itself into the global economy and thereby absorbing the latest scientific and technological developments in record time, but the circumstances that enabled this may not have been available to the Soviet leaders. — location: 553 ^ref-39706

Producers were concerned above all to meet targets set by planners. They had no particular reason to concern themselves with the wishes of the users of their products, nor with the activities of competitors. Indeed, the concept of competition was absent: other producers in the same line of activity were simply not competitors but fellow-executors of the state plan. — location: 569 ^ref-60144

if a large section of the intelligentsia stops believing in the basic philosophical and economic underpinnings of society, this constitutes a quite serious problem — location: 582 ^ref-20924

Attempts to rapidly dismantle the cultural/ideological legacy of class society – most notably the Cultural Revolution in China – have not achieved their aims. Socialist society does not emerge ‘on its own foundations, but, on the contrary’, Marx wrote in 1875, ‘from capitalist society’. It is therefore ‘in every respect, economically, morally, and intellectually, still stamped with the birthmarks of the old society from whose womb it emerges’. — location: 587 ^ref-60756

Socialism Betrayed — location: 598 ^ref-64315

‘the shadow economy was running out of space for expanded reproduction; consequently, its bosses raised the question of how to weaken political restraints by influencing the state and Party apparatus, including the CPSU Central Committee, from the inside. It was under such pressures that perestroika came into existence.’ — location: 611 ^ref-63071

Capitalism is actually far superior to socialism when it comes to the industry of death and destruction: in an economy aimed at furnishing profits for corporations, a large market for high-value single-use products like nuclear bombs is a wonderful thing, hence the position of the military-industrial complex at the heart of United States government. — location: 630 ^ref-5678

A key issue was the absence of an effective feedback loop. — location: 651 ^ref-62694

The early period of his rule, from 1964 to around 1973, is generally considered as having been rather successful in terms of economic growth and geopolitical consolidation. — location: 659 ^ref-33618

Andropov seemed to understand the problems facing the Soviet Union and to have a sensible vision for addressing them. — location: 672 ^ref-29122

the economic problems fed into a general sentiment of dissatisfaction that reduced the masses’ confidence in socialism and, therefore, their willingness to fight for it when it came under attack. The economic problems also created a stratum of people who felt they would do better under conditions of capitalism: people running small businesses in the informal sector who would benefit from freer markets; and managers and intellectuals who saw socialism as an impediment to a life of privilege. — location: 684 ^ref-29124

Rather than carry out a fundamental economic reform – as China had been doing for a decade – Gorbachev and then Yeltsin capitulated to the West, dissolved the Communist Party, accepted shock therapy and the break-up of the USSR. — location: 690 ^ref-31888

By the time the Communist Party leadership itself started (under Gorbachev) to challenge the basic beliefs underlying the system, the masses were by and large sufficiently alienated from these beliefs that they were ambivalent in the face of this cyclopean act of social sabotage. — location: 714 ^ref-55746

Yet this same leadership had supported Stalin when he was alive. This disparity can at least be partly explained by the fast-changing political environment. Harsh repression and the personality cult both had their roots in political necessity, in a context where the young Soviet state was desperately struggling for its life. — location: 732 ^ref-36102

Instead of the European working class coming to the aid of its Soviet brothers and sisters, the European ruling classes came to the aid of the White Army of deposed capitalists and landowners in order to destroy the Soviet project. — location: 744 ^ref-5549

On the contrary, the personalities and motives of Stalin and the other leaders were socially formed according to the requirements of the situation, and the leadership itself was socially selected on the basis of the effects of these two elements. — location: 758 ^ref-59511

It should have been possible to make political changes without launching a severe frontal attack on Stalin and all that he represented. Stalin was the most prominent Soviet leader from 1924 until his death in 1953. In other words, Stalin led the USSR for twenty-nine of the thirty-six years of the USSR’s existence. To criticize him so harshly, to tear down a personality cult so suddenly, meant to cast doubt on the entire Soviet experience to that point; it meant to delegitimize the extraordinary achievements of the CPSU and the Soviet people during the Stalin era. — location: 804 ^ref-10136

We fought the Nazis with the battle cry ‘For the Homeland! For Stalin!’, and they wanted to pull down the statue. Over our dead bodies, we said. We stood firm, and we won. (‘Villagers put Stalin back on pedestal’, 2015) — location: 825 ^ref-15519

the first steps towards undermining Soviet ideology had been taken, and these laid the ground for the generation of right-wing and liberal intellectuals who, in the Gorbachev era, made their way to the heart of government and led the dismantling of socialism. — location: 829 ^ref-14212

‘to put it in the simplest terms, the October Revolution created a world communist movement, the 20th Congress destroyed it’. — location: 833 ^ref-8093

There is a considerable continuity in Stalin’s efforts to keep the hostility of capitalist powers at bay, and Khrushchev’s call for peaceful coexistence. — location: 885 ^ref-51897

in the industrialized world the insurrectionary ferment of the now largely sated working class was replaced by the alienation of students and racial minorities.’ — location: 896 ^ref-8595

The Soviet Union was less experienced in dealing with these movements than it was with the traditional organizations of the industrial working class, and Soviet socialism had a less obvious appeal for them. — location: 897 ^ref-17723

the Chinese strongly encouraged Khrushchev to intervene in Hungary in 1956, but then denounced the intervention in Czechoslovakia as an example of ‘social imperialism’. — location: 903 ^ref-51931

the theory of the general crisis severely underestimated post-war capitalism’s ability to cheat death. The Soviet Union won the Second World War, but in so doing it sustained the most horrific human and economic losses. The United States, meanwhile, had been able to attach itself to the winning side and turn a handsome profit at the same time. — location: 941 ^ref-46747

the US was able to breathe new life into global capitalism after the Second World War by using its economic dominance to reduce inter-imperialist rivalry, give a kick-start to economic globalization, introduce some Keynesian reforms, prevent several countries from adopting socialism (via bribery, coups and/or military intervention), and unite efforts to isolate and destabilize the socialist camp. — location: 956 ^ref-4388

The United States had a number of advantages that enabled it to sustain steady growth throughout the 1950s and 1960s: unlike the Soviet Union, it was not devastated by war; unlike in the Soviet Union, wars and military expenditure constituted an economic boost rather than a drain; unlike the Soviet Union, it benefited immensely from the exploitation of people and resources in the developing world; and unlike the Soviet Union, it felt no particular obligation to privilege the basic needs of the masses over the exploration of new markets and technologies. — location: 973 ^ref-25912

once an expectation is set, the failure to meet it creates disappointment. — location: 980 ^ref-53119

By the late 1970s, Soviet growth was grinding to a halt, just as the United States and Western Europe were starting to dial up their attacks on the organized working class, privatizing, globalizing, deregulating, lowering wages, and leveraging technology to stimulate a redefined economy with the balance of power tipped even further in favour of the capitalist class. — location: 982 ^ref-6879

The need to widen democracy and allow greater individual freedoms is a complex problem for socialist states under siege. In a world dominated by imperialism, a socialist leadership has to carefully balance responding to the legitimate demands and needs of the people with not creating structures that can easily be leveraged by hostile states to destabilize and to spread disinformation. — location: 1012 ^ref-35178

With a declining communist and collectivist mentality, a capitalist and individualist mentality reappeared quickly to fill the gap, fuelled by Western propaganda and by the habits preserved in the social fabric through many centuries of class society pre-1917. — location: 1037 ^ref-35500

All this, to use Marx’s terminology, are consequences of the alienation of labour and they do not automatically and suddenly evaporate from the mind, although alienation itself has already been abolished. — location: 1043 ^ref-21642

In a context of rising alienation, economic stagnation and ideological deterioration, it was easy enough for the seeds of counterrevolution to sprout. — location: 1059 ^ref-50821

Previous agreements on nuclear treaties, which seemed to have stabilized the situation, were undermined by the Reagan administration.’ — location: 1083 ^ref-41292

Capitalism has a built-in advantage over socialism in areas of production that do not directly benefit people. — location: 1084 ^ref-31743

The arms race has been imposed on the Soviet Union entirely by the US and other NATO countries. — location: 1096 ^ref-59898

This economic warfare did not stop with denying the Soviets access to high-tech; the US also sabotaged the goods the Soviets did receive. — location: 1114 ^ref-28559

the CIA and the Pentagon ‘abandoned the idea of the mere “containment” of communism in favour of using military force to push back against its exertions – even when these were met with massive popular support’. — location: 1138 ^ref-12789

The struggle that the Emir of Afghanistan is waging for the independence of Afghanistan is objectively a revolutionary struggle, despite the monarchist views of the Emir and his associates, for it weakens, disintegrates and undermines imperialism. — location: 1176 ^ref-33196

Land reform, debt cancellation and gender equality should have been popular among the masses of poor peasants, but the landowners and mullahs had better access to these people and were able to convince many of them that the PDPA’s programme was a ruthless attack on Islam by godless urban communists. — location: 1216 ^ref-6301

the operation against the Afghan government started well before the arrival of the Soviet army: — location: 1234 ^ref-9146

Indeed, it was July 3, 1979 that President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. — location: 1237 ^ref-5199

The first Russian troops crossed the border into Afghanistan on December 25, 1979. The scope of their mission was limited: help their contacts in the PDPA to overthrow Amin and establish the Parcham leader Babrak Karmal as head of state; end the feuding in the PDPA; help the Afghan Army gain the upper hand against the uprising; and come home soon. There was absolutely no question of wanting to colonize or occupy Afghanistan. — location: 1254 ^ref-61640

the US was more than happy to see the Soviet Union intervene military in Afghanistan. — location: 1265 ^ref-7099

an opponent of the Soviet intervention, writes, ‘What I saw in 1981, and on three other visits to several cities over the 14 years that the PDPA was in charge, convinced me that it was a much less bad option than the regime on offer from the western-supported Mujahedin.’ — location: 1287 ^ref-51435

When I visited Afghanistan in September 2008 . . . I was told by almost every Afghan I met that things were better under the Russians. . . . The Russians, I was told, had built the elements of industry, whereas now most of the aid money simply ended up in the wrong pockets in the wrong countries. — location: 1290 ^ref-27793

The United States deployed increasingly sophisticated weaponry to the rebel groups at just the right rate so as to prevent the Soviet Union from either winning or withdrawing. — location: 1296 ^ref-5954

It’s worth pointing out that Gorbachev never put much meat on the bones of ‘democratization’. With hindsight, it’s obvious that his use of the term reflected an ideological concession to Western ‘liberal’ capitalism; that he had come to believe that the Soviet Union should aspire to the political norms defined in Western Europe and the United States. — location: 1518 ^ref-61617

a level of political repression is an unhappy necessity. The needs of the few – to get fantastically rich – cannot be allowed to compromise the needs of the many to enjoy a dignified, peaceful and fulfilling life. — location: 1534 ^ref-4064

The Soviet political system was undeniably rife with problems: the alienation and disaffection of young people, excessively centralized decision-making, corruption, arbitrariness by police and officials, insufficient levels of popular participation in the soviets, and more. But these were not problems that could be solved by imitating a Western bourgeois-democratic model that had no cultural and social basis in the USSR. Rather, political reforms should have attempted to build on and improve the existing system. — location: 1536 ^ref-16872

Szymanski describes ‘a few basic assumptions of Soviet society’ that were not debated in the press: socialism as a system, communism as a goal, and the leading role of the Communist Party. ‘These issues are considered to have been settled once and for all and public discussion of them is considered by the regime to be potentially disruptive of popular rule.’ — location: 1549 ^ref-34125

the basic assumptions of capitalism: the supremacy of private property; profit as the major engine of economic activity; exploitation of labour as the source of profit. — location: 1553 ^ref-50433

more importantly because Gorbachev’s schemes were not convincing and well thought out. — location: 1556 ^ref-1913

From the early days Gorbachev saw the CPSU as the main obstacle, and the Party apparatus as his main enemy, not as an instrument to carry the struggle for reform forward. — location: 1564 ^ref-16732

Glasnost, then, was an attempt to ‘unleash the public’, where the public was defined as people who unambiguously supported perestroika. — location: 1567 ^ref-59841

Continuing support for perestroika was to be found primarily outside the Party leadership, particularly among capitalist restorationists, anti-Soviet nationalists of assorted hue, sections of the intelligentsia, and the new generation of small capitalists and managers that could not wait to get filthy rich. — location: 1568 ^ref-4786

create greater executive power for Gorbachev and his allies. — location: 1574 ^ref-3210

‘the proposal, introduced in the final minutes in a surprise resolution by Gorbachev in the chair, amounted to the overthrow of the Central Committee’. Disoriented by the sudden appearance and radical nature of the proposals, a majority of delegates voted in its favour. — location: 1577 ^ref-63859

‘in the name of promoting young cadres and of reform, Gorbachev replaced large numbers of party, political and military leaders with anti-CPSU and anti-socialist cadres or cadres with ambivalent positions. — location: 1587 ^ref-53761

As the communists were systematically removed from the Party and state leadership, supporters of ‘radical reform’ were promoted, including Boris Yeltsin. — location: 1594 ^ref-20846

Given almost complete autonomy in the areas of media and propaganda, Yakovlev went about ‘overcoming myths and utopias’ by doing everything possible to attack the CPSU and Soviet history. He went so far as to claim that the October Revolution was simply part of Germany’s First World War strategy: ‘The October Revolution was the action of the German General Staff. Lenin received two million marks in March 1915 for sabotage’ — location: 1606 ^ref-63240

‘It is a broad attack against communism, and Stalin is merely a convenient symbol’, — location: 1623 ^ref-15039

Gorbachev and his allies decided to end restrictions on foreign propaganda, for example putting an end to the jamming of Radio Liberty — location: 1645 ^ref-45234

It is disgusting to see how many people, even in the Soviet Union itself, are engaged in denying and destroying the history-making feats and extraordinary merits of that heroic people. That is not the way to rectify and overcome the undeniable errors made by a revolution that emerged from tsarist authoritarianism in an enormous, backward, poor country. We shouldn’t blame Lenin now for having chosen tsarist Russia as the place for the greatest revolution in history. — location: 1654 ^ref-818

The outright attack on the CPSU and the undermining of its authority is unique to Gorbachev. — location: 1661 ^ref-55137

Attacking the CPSU backfired badly for Gorbachev. He had made a dangerous assumption: that the liberals and nationalists he promoted would give him the political support denied him by the communists, thus allowing him to realize his dreams of a mixed economy with a welfare state and political pluralism. In fact, these elements wanted to go much further than Gorbachev. — location: 1671 ^ref-50627

Gorbachev responded to the US request that the Soviet Union participate in the 1991 Gulf War by saying, ‘I want to emphasize that we would like to be by your side in any situation. We want decisions to be made that will strengthen, not undermine, the authority of the United States’ — location: 1690 ^ref-56649

The media had succeeded in creating a political atmosphere in which any criticism of perestroika was simply ‘Stalinism’ – a word whose usage had come to imply acceptance of the most hyperbolic McCarthyite propaganda. — location: 1709 ^ref-49236

frustrated by the economic crisis and falling prey to the cynical demagoguery of Yeltsin and his coterie who blamed all problems on socialist planning and the ‘privileged bureaucracy’, coal miners carried out strikes on an unprecedented scale. Gorbachev had little choice but to go running to the Western banks, with which the Soviet Union quickly worked up a sizeable debt. — location: 1737 ^ref-3118

Our people have never rejected socialism. They were simply deceived by demagoguery and false promises. — location: 1748 ^ref-13139

the proportion of ‘yes’ votes was slightly lower in Russia (73 per cent) and Ukraine (71 per cent) but extremely high in the Central Asian republics (over 94 per cent in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and Belarus. This reflects a growing eurocentrism and reactionary nationalism within Russia and Ukraine that resented sharing a state with ‘backward’ and ‘burdensome’ Asians – a prejudice that Yeltsin and others played to. — location: 1763 ^ref-63798

Yeltsin led the drive towards greater autonomy for Russia. He is on record as saying, in 1990, ‘I soon understood that there would be no radical reforms at an all-Union level . . . and so I thought to myself: If the reforms cannot be carried out at that level, why not try in Russia?’ — location: 1768 ^ref-24690

The USSR’s dissolution at the end of 1991 was in that sense profoundly anti-democratic. However, crisis and confusion were so entrenched that, while people might vote for socialism, most were not mobilized to fight for it. — location: 1774 ^ref-19986

people came to believe they could ‘join together the glittering world of commodities under capitalism and the social security of socialism’ — location: 1822 ^ref-31938

the basic history of German partition and the Berlin Wall continues to be wilfully misrepresented. — location: 1830 ^ref-21781

the Soviet Union and its allies in the German Communist Party (KPD) had pushed strongly for a unified German state that would have multi-party elections, that would be prevented from rearmament and that would be committed to neutrality. — location: 1831 ^ref-15312

Germany: the Federal German Republic (FRG), established in May 1949. It was only then that the GDR was set up as a separate, socialist state. The border in Berlin then became the nexus for covert actions by Western imperialism against the socialist bloc (it should be recalled that, throughout this era, US-led capitalism was waging a horrifically violent global crusade against progressive forces, from Cuba to Korea, from Vietnam to Indonesia, from Guatemala to Congo). — location: 1835 ^ref-48302

Breaking with the tradition that the Politburo and Central Committee should have representation from all the republics, Gorbachev oversaw a ‘russification’ of the central bodies, feeding into resentment and rising complaints about Russian chauvinism. — location: 1857 ^ref-39951

The first republic to quit the USSR was Russia in June 1990. This was an unconstitutional move made by Yeltsin. It was motivated primarily by the impatience of the neoliberal hawks, who wanted to go faster than Gorbachev down the capitalist road. — location: 1869 ^ref-50521

Now the Russian Republic was asserting its right to control its own natural resources and their disposition. The leaderships of the republics which had previously been relatively quiet now immediately passed sovereignty resolutions. By August 1990 sovereignty resolutions had been passed by Uzbekistan, Moldavia, Ukraine, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan. By October even loyal Kazakhstan followed suit as well. — location: 1875 ^ref-21381

Yeltsin ignored the negotiations for a new union agreement and moved purposefully towards declaring Russian independence. — location: 1932 ^ref-42096

There was little support for Soviet dissolution in the Central Asian and Caucasian republics, but it was not conceivable to carry the Soviet Union on without its most populous and prominent component, namely Russia. — location: 1945 ^ref-47141

With no legal precedent or constitutional framework, Yeltsin simply transferred the Soviet state bodies and property to Russia, and on December 31, the Soviet Union formally ceased to exist. — location: 1948 ^ref-41971

It was not a revolution; it was a coup. A great country was removed from the map, against the wishes of the majority of its people, by opportunist and conniving leaders. It was nothing short of a tragedy. — location: 1949 ^ref-61791

Question: What did capitalism accomplish in one year that communism could not do in seventy years? Answer: Make communism look good. – A joke circulating in Russia in 1992 — location: 1960 ^ref-52464

It took around 15 years for Russian GDP to recover to 1990 levels – during which period China’s GDP increased by around 300 per cent. — location: 1984 ^ref-19972

It is now widely believed that US-led finance capital knowingly directed the post-Soviet Russian economy into disaster so as to: 1) thoroughly wipe out the economic roots of socialism by replacing it with gangster anarcho-capitalism; and 2) to prevent the Russian Federation from becoming a serious competitor to US post-Cold War hegemony. — location: 2009 ^ref-12551

The importance of the USSR’s role as a counterweight to US/NATO imperialism was made achingly clear by the series of imperialist wars that took place during and after the Soviet demise. — location: 2036 ^ref-36182

Saddam Hussein’s misplaced hope in early 1991 that Gorbachev would act to restrain US warmongering against Iraq. — location: 2038 ^ref-16881

Horrifically destructive US-led wars soon followed in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Iraq (again), Libya and elsewhere. — location: 2042 ^ref-47612

Countries unwilling to play ball were subjected to the threat of violence. In the case of Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Iraq, threat was converted into genocidal reality. — location: 2044 ^ref-52069

The collapse of the Soviet Union and European socialism could reasonably be described as the worst defeat suffered by the global working class in its history. It gave a lifeline to imperialism and set back the cause of human liberation by several decades. — location: 2055 ^ref-61461

If the USSR had been able to overcome its economic stagnation from the 1970s onwards, there’s every reason to believe it would still exist today. The manifold political and social problems that sprang up in the 1980s were fertilized by a latent dissatisfaction with regard to living standards. — location: 2073 ^ref-44287

in the 1930s and ’40s, the heavily centralized Soviet economy was working very well: ‘The rapid development of modern industry was interwoven with the construction of a welfare state that guaranteed the economic and social rights of citizens in a way that was unprecedented.’ — location: 2080 ^ref-362

‘the transition from great historical crisis to a more normal period’ in which ‘the masses’ enthusiasm and commitment to production and work weakened and then disappeared’. — location: 2083 ^ref-59584

Gorbachev’s reforms were implemented in an impatient, heavy-handed, top-down way, without consulting the people or attempting to collate feedback. His methodology was profoundly flawed. Soviet economists transitioned from central-planning dogma to neoliberal dogma, failing to come up with creative approaches that accurately took account of existing strengths and weaknesses. — location: 2097 ^ref-53938

He didn’t mobilize the existing, proven state structures, but sought to weaken them. The media wasn’t used to unite the people behind a programme of development but to denigrate the Communist Party. — location: 2107 ^ref-45304

The attack on the Party was putatively carried out in the name of enhancing democracy, yet the results turned out to be profoundly anti-democratic. The Communist Party had been the major vehicle for promoting the needs and ideas of the working class; once it was sidelined, the workers had no obvious means of organizing in defence of their interests. — location: 2113 ^ref-26264

Khrushchev and Gorbachev both thought that tarnishing the Soviet Communist Party’s historical record would somehow help to rally forces for constructing a renewed socialism; they were wrong. — location: 2118 ^ref-47397

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